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The Coast Guard will receive the first of a new class of
vessel, the 270 foot medium endurance cutter, beginning during
the late summer of 1981.
Records show extensive planning to determine the optimum
physical structure as well as the optimum mix and number of
personnel.
The purpose of this study is to develop the optimum organi-
zational structure which will support the interaction between
the people and the physical characteristics of the vessel.
Three major factors were analyzed as part of this study.
First, the operational requirements imposed on the vessel.
Second, the environment which affects the vessel's ability to
perform its operational requirements. Third, the availability
of alternative design structures as determined from a review
of the literature on structuring organizations.
Ultimately, a structural design is selected which best matches
the organizational environment of the new Coast Guard WMEC-270
with its operational requirements in order to optimize the ef-
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the late summer of 1981 the Coast Guard will receive the
first of a new class of vessel, the two hundred and seventy
foot medium endurance cutter henceforth referred to as WMEC-270.
A major objective in the design of any new class of vessel is
to achieve optimum effectiveness through the utilization of the
most recent technological innovation. A second. major objective
is to maintain the optimum effectiveness through the proper mix
and number of personnel assigned. Optimum effectiveness is re-
presented by achievement of established organizational goals
for which the WMEC-270 was designed.
In reviewing the design of the WMEC-270 there is no doubt
in my mind that the latest technological innovations have been
incorporated. The major physical difference between this ship
and its predecessors, the WMEC-210 and the WHEC-378, is that
complex automated equipment has been incorporated into almost
every aspect of shipboard operation; e. g.
,
galley equipment, auto-
matic tank sounding, automatic milstrip processing, and automatic
recording of the quartermaster log. The main focus of the crew
will be keeping the ship running rather than running the ship.
Most ship construction in recent years has been affected by
fiscal constraints resulting in less than optimum physical char-
acteristics. The design of the new WMEC-270 does not reflect
any such constraint. From the physical perspective, it is hard
to imagine a more innovative vessel.
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The WMEC-270 does fall short of being able to operate in
a fully automated mode. It requires personnel to maintain the
vessel and its equipment, assist in the performance of its many
missions, and provide for the safety and well being of the ves-
sel and the crew.
The studies of personnel allowances and complement have
been ongoing for several years and is still being debated in
some areas. While the optimum mix and number of personnel is
certainly important, I am sure that any deficiencies will be
quickly discovered and corrected once the vessel begins operation,
Therefore, although I have some concern that the present manning
level was established without considering all needs such as in-
port watchstanding requirements, I do believe the manning level
will have no long term negative impact on the effectiveness of
the vessel.
What does concern me is that there is little evidence that
the planners placed any substantial importance on the organiza-
tional structure that would be used to control this new ves-
sel's operation.* If the importance of the new structure was
recognized, there is no evidence that any design was considered
that varied from the standard shipboard organization design
(see figure l). Certainly the ability of a unit to perform at
its optimum is dependent on many factors. Three of the most
important are the physical capabilities, the capabilities of
the personnel assigned, and the ability of the organizational

















CO. - Commanding Officer X.O. - Executive Officer
Figure 1
Standard shipboard organizational structure
(slightly abbreviated)

Figure 2 is Leavitt's model for describing organizations
(March 1965) • This model essentially states that there are five
dimensions of an organization: goals, technology, people, struc-
ture, and environment. Changes in any one dimension require
adjustments in the others to insure optimization of the organ-
ization. It appears that the Coast Guard has spent much time
and money developing the technology of the WMEC-270 while it
may perform at less than optimum because insufficient consider-
ation has been given to alternative organizational designs.
Consequently, this study was undertaken to develop the optimum
structure based on a comparative study of various alternatives
and the advantages and disadvantages related to each.
Traditionally, ships have been controlled by a rigid verti-
cal structure with the Commanding Officer at the top. Despite
the growing complexity of Coast Guard vessels and the increased
mission requirements, the control mechanism has remained vir-
tually unchanged. The normal response to any new operational
or administrative requirement is the establishment of another
vertical channel in the structure. Several possible reasons
for the similarity over time and across units include: first,
the optimum design was discovered years ago when the structure
was first implemented and there is no reason to change; second,
Coast Guard planners believe the optimum design is presently
being utilized and there is no reason to consider variances
just because the vessel differs in age, complexity, number of
























Leavitt's Model of Organizations
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considered to be important or have an impact on the optimum
effectiveness of a unit.
I disagree with all three reasons and agree with the Coast
Guard Commandant when he stated on 16 January 1980 (State of
the Coast Guard speech) that we have to be a little more aggres-
sive and unconventional in how we achieve the personnel and work
place support so needed throughout the service. I further
agree with the seven objectives he stated in that same State
of the Coast Guard speech - two of which relate directly to
the importance of organizational design and organizational de-
sign considerations: objective four called for improved inter-
nal organization and management so the Coast Guard will remain
vital, effective, and responsive; objective five expressed the
need for innovative, cost-effective use of technology to manage
the information explosion.
Organizational design is a technology that offers a wide
range of possibilities. There are designs such as the hierarchy
of the Catholic church that have been around for centuries and
designs such as the four dimensional matrix recently adopted by
some electronic firms. The success of any design over any
other design within a given organizational setting is related
to many factors that will be explored during the course of this
thesis.
It is the purpose of the organization structure of any oper-
ating unit to process information, solve problems, and direct
task accomplishment, keeping in mind the needs and desires of
12

the Coast Guard as well as the needs and desires of the personnel
attached to the unit. It is the purpose of this study to iden-




II. HISTORY OF THE WMEC-270
The first step in a rational approach to organization theory
is the establishment of goals to fulfill some need. Following
a goal statement is the selection of a technology which will
best achieve the established goals. A third step is to deter-
mine the mix and number of people necessary to match both the
goals and the technology. The fourth step is the development
of an organization structure which will guide the interactions
of the people and the technology for the purpose of achieving
the established goals. The fifth and final step is the fine
tuning of the four previous steps in order to maintain a suc-
cessful organization.
The development of the WMEC-270 has followed the first three
steps of this rational approach. This chapter will review the
action taken in each of those steps. The following chapters
will consider certain aspects of the fourth step. The fifth
step, probably the most important, is a continuous process which
will begin once the vessel becomes operational.
A. GOALS
On 12 November 197^ an updated Cutter Plan (CG-380-4) was
submitted to the Commandant indicating a need for a new class
of vessel. This recommendation was the result of a process be-
gun in 1973 which compared the mission requirements of the
14

Coast Guard with the capabilities, quantity, and anticipated
longevity of the existing inventory of Coast Guard ships. The
comparison clearly showed the growing disparity which exists
between the Coast Guard's operating program requirements and
1
the means available to accomplish them. Seventy-five percent
of the operational requirements included tasks related to search
and rescue, enforcement of laws and treaties, and military pre-
paredness. The remaining twenty-five percent were for tasks
attributable to the marine environmental protection and marine
science programs. Thus, the need and the goal to satisfy that
need were established before there was any idea what the new
cutter would look like.
B. TECHNOLOGY
During the two months following the submission of the up-
dated Cutter Plan a feasibility study was conducted by the
Offices of Operations and Engineering. This study recommended
a medium endurance cutter over a high endurance cutter and was
followed by a three month study which developed nine design
alternatives. The preliminary design was approved by the Coast
Guard Commandant on 2k December 1975'
During the next year the design of the WMEC-270 was formal-
ized. In a memo to the Secretary of Transportation dated 5
November 1976, the Coast Guard Commandant requested authority
1Transportation Systems Acquisition Review Committee Briefing
held on 1 December 1976.
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to proceed without delay in the acquisition of the first four
WMEG-270's. The ship includes the following features:
a. Major Characteristics:
Length overall 270 feet
Beam, extreme 38-3 feet
Draft, full load 13 .3 feet
Displacement, full 1730 tons
Speed (max) 19-7 knots
Endurance 21 days
Machinery, diesel 7000 horsepower
b. A navy provided LAMPS III (Light Airborne Multi-
purpose System) for military preparedness missions.
c. A MK 92 Gun Fire Control System in conjunction with
a MK 75 » 76 millimeter gun mount.
d. A Command Display and Control System (C0MDAC) for
integrating the following electronic subsystems: weapons,
sensors, navigation, Combat Information Center (C.I.C.) and
bridge functions.
Thus, almost two years after the need for a new cutter was as-
certained, the technology for fulfilling that need was selected,
C . PEOPLE
With the incorporation of the C0MDAC System into the design
of the WMEC , many of the routine functions previously performed
by personnel were eliminated; e.g
.,
quartermaster s log, fully
automated C.I.C, and sounding tank sensors. Consequently, the
16

manpower requirements would be unique to any previously designed
Coast Guard vessel." The major considerations were the personnel
necessary to man emergency stations such as general quarters
and the personnel required to maintain the vessel's advanced
technology in working order. The present personnel require-
ments of the WMEC-210 and WHEC-378 were used as guidelines for
determining the needs of the WMEC-270.
Phase I of a three phase manning analysis was completed on
25 March 1976 (Chief of Operations Memo 5320dated25 March 1976).
The manning requirements were based on a fully self-sustained
vessel. As of 23 September 1980 the following manpower require-
ments had been established: 9 commissioned officers; 2 chief
warrant officers; 8 chief petty officers; 51 other petty offi-
cers; and 21 non-rated personnel. This allowance does not in-
clude those members of the aviation detachment who would normally
be onboard whenever the vessel deployed. Studies of the manning
requirements will no doubt continue and changes incorporated
long after the vessel becomes operational.
D . STRUCTURE
There is no evidence that any organizational design alter-
natives were considered beyond the design used for virtually
all Coast Guard vessels. Figure 3 displays this design as it
can best be determined from the personnel studies. (WMEC-270











C.O. - Commanding Officer X.O. - Executive Officer
E.O. - Engineering Officer W.O. - Weapons Officer
OPS - Operations Officer
Main Prop - Main propulsion Division Aux - Auxiliary Division
Dck - Deck Division Wpns - Weapons Division
Adm - Administration Division Comm - Communications Division
Elec - Electronics Division Sub Spc - Subsistence Specialist
Division
Brdg Ops - Bridge Operations Division
Figure 3




At present there are expected to be 13 WMEC-270' s . The first
four, BEAR, TAMPA, HARRIET LANE, and NORTHLAND, are scheduled
to be delivered from Tacoma Boatbuilding between 18 August 1981
and 12 August 1982. These vessels will be first scheduled for
deployment between 1 October 1982 and 6 June 1983- All four
will be homeported in Portsmouth, Virginia.
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III. LITERATURE REVIEW *
Virtually every organization has a reason for existence
which can be translated into the accomplishment of some task
or service. Most authors use the term output to refer to the
end product of organizations. According to Beer (1980) the
output of an organization is considered complete when the task
or service meets three performance criteria: effectiveness -
meeting the specified goals established for the task; effici-
ency - utilization of resources only to the extent necessary
for task completion with minimum wastes; and organizational
health which is comprised of two major components - first, de-
velopment of congruence among the goals of the organization,
the employees, and society; second, the ability of the organi-
zation to recognize the need for change and implement corrective
measures.
A. ORGANIZATION MODELS
One of the most widely accepted models used today to de-
scribe how organizations take inputs from the environment and
return outputs to the environment is the social systems pre-
sented in figure k. The conversion process used by organizations
varies because characteristics of the inputs and outputs are
different and also because environmental factors such as state
of technology, availability of resources, and society goals
20

affect different organizations to different degrees. As a
reaction to environmental influences beyond the control of the
organization, conversion processes must be established which
will achieve the desired output state.
Figure 5 visually displays the environmental factors as
independent variables, the conversion process factors as in-
termediate variables, and the output factors as dependent var-
iables. Organizational structure is the only intermediate
variable being considered by this study. As a further limita-
tion, the only structural dimension being considered is the
organization design and the process resulting from that design.
The reason for these limitations is that this study is related
to a particular organization - the Coast Guard WMEC-270. Within
the Coast Guard, changes to such conversion processes as training
and supervision and even such structural dimensions as pay and
promotion and accounting and control policies are largely es-
tablished through servicewide procedures. Except in unusual
circumstances, changes to these procedures are done throughout
the Coast Guard without regard to how changes might affect the
internal processes of an individual unit. Additionally, an
operational unit has authority to change its design of internal
structure and such changes do not generally require approval
or servicewide adoption.
Many theories of organization structure have been generated
and revised over time. The most widely accepted theory at



















































Systems Model - Dependent Variables
22

(1973) describes most simply as a theory based on two conclu-
sions: there is no one best way to organize; and any way of
organizing is not equally effective. Essentially the theory
contends that to be successful, organizations must adopt a
structure which best deals with the unique environmental fac-
tors affecting that organization.
Figure 5 is a skeleton model of the relationships between
the independent, intermediate, and dependent variables. The
following pages will attempt to fill in the dimensions of these
variables beginning with the dependent and working back towards
the independent. Figure 6 is the first step of this process.
The dependent variables were described in the first paragraph
of this chapter. Next follows a discussion regarding the in-
termediate variables.
B. ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE
Organizational structure can be described as both a static
and dynamic concept (Kilmann, Pondy, and Slevin, 1976). As a
static concept it is a chart which depicts the manner in which
subunits are divided and the way in which responsibility and
communications flow within an organization to facilitate inte-
gration of subtasks into the whole tasks.
Duncan (1979) describes the dynamic concept of organizational
structure as the pattern of interactions and coordination that
links the technology, tasks, and human components of the organ-
ization to insure that its purpose is accomplished. Others
23

go further by describing the actual linkages that structure
should create in order to achieve an acceptable level of per-
formance. Mintzberg (1979). for example, describes nine spe-
cific linking devices which should be used to hold organizations
together. He has placed these nine parameters into four groups:
design of positions; design of the superstructure (departmen-
talization); design of lateral linkages; and design of the
decision making system. All four of these processes are ac-
counted for through the four major functions of organizational
structure (Khandwalla, 1977; Lippitt, 1973):
1. reduction of uncertainty through forecasting and
planning;
2. conducting a wide variety of activities as a result
of departmentalization and specialization;
3- integration of activities;
k. problem solving.
The static attributes of organizational structure, repre-
sented by the organization chart, can assume an infinite number
of shapes, but are generally classified into broad categories.
Summer (1976) and Beer (1980) use three categories while Khand-
walla (1977) discusses seven categories. For the purpose of
this study the five categories presented by Mintzberg (1979)
will be used for comparative analysis. Mintzberg' s five cate-
gories are: Simple; Machine Bureaucracy; Professional Bureau-
cracy; Divisionalized; and Adhocracy. These are the static
designs, each possessing a unique set of dynamic attributes
24

so that the four functions of organizational structure can be
accomplished. These dynamic attributes, more than the static
design, separates one form from another.
The Simple structure is best characterized as non-structure
Coordination is achieved through direct supervision from the
top on down. There are few departments and even fewer hier-
archial levels. Forecasting, planning, and problem solving
are generally the exclusive responsibility of the chief execu-
tive. Khandwalla (1977) labeled the managerial styles of these
simple organizations as power-oriented, entrepreneurial, and
seat-of-the-pants . For the most part, the simple form of struc-
ture is a temporary state that organizations, particularly new
organizations, pass through during early growth periods.
The Machine Bureaucracy is characterized by a high degree
of specialization, a proliferation of rules and regulations
as well as other mechanisms to formalize behavior, and a divi-
sion of personnel according to functional skills. The environ-
ment for these types of organizations does not exert much
pressure, and what pressure is exerted remains mostly constant
over time. Decisions are made high in the organization and
staff personnel are given some power over line operators for
the purpose of standardizing interdepartmental behavior. The
primary thrust of the Machine Bureaucracy is to perform a large




Training is the distinguishing characteristic of the Pro-
fessional Bureaucracy. Through training, organizations in this
category attempt to standardize skills to allow for a high de-
gree of coordination between sub-tasks. Employees are permitted
a great amount of latitude and control over their tasks because
of the high level of professionalism they possess. The power
in the Professional Bureaucracy is based on expertise rather
than on position as in the Simple structure and the Machine
Bureaucracy.
The Divisionalized form of structure is primarily suitable
for large organizations and is basically represented by a ser-
ies of Machine Bureaucracies or an occasional Professional
Bureaucracy. Divisions can be based upon geography, market,
product, or some other criteria. Each division is treated as
a separate entity. The primary function of the overall struc-
ture is to ensure standardization of output and quality control.
The structure is primarily used for large conglomerates and
even then there is some argument whether the conglomerate is
more effective than breaking the many divisions into individual
enterprises.
The fifth and final structure described by Mintzberg and
recognized by many other authors (although frequently called
by different names) is the Adhocracy. This type of structure
is characterized by a lack of formal behavior mechanisms. Mem-
bers of the organization are given wide latitudes with respect
to their jobs. There is a heavy reliance on personal liaison
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rather than standard coordination mechanisms. Roles in an
Adhocracy shift from person to person depending on the projects
being developed or the tasks being performed and the expertise
of the individuals. Power shifts regularly from one group to
another depending on who has the fresh ideas and the greatest
chance of success. Long term success is based upon short term
success and managers must continuously promote new ideas with-
out being inhibited by standard operating procedures. The ma-
trix, an organization structure consisting of more than one
communication and supervision channel, is the most common type
of adhocracy in use today.
Figure 7 is a more complete representation of the relation-
ship between the performance of an organization and the environ-
ment as it is buffered through a particular form of structure.
As the model shows, all structures perform the same processes.
It is the degree to which these processes are accomplished that
makes each structure unique. It is the environment which must
dictate the structure in order to achieve the proper degree of
structural process; e.g., integration. The following discussion
identifies those factors of the environment which are considered
to have the greatest impact on structural design.
C. ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS
The condition most often mentioned as a factor which in-
fluences structure is the degree of uncertainty. Galbraith
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of information required to perform the task and the amount of
information possessed by the organization. More simply, degree
of uncertainty is related to the need for information processing.
The greater the uncertainty, the greater the need for infor-
mation processing. Khandwalla (1977) also lists the reduction
of uncertainty as a primary function of organizational structure
and therefore the degree to which uncertainty exists in both
the internal and external environment should influence structural
design. Duncan (1972, 1979) believes that the degree of uncer-
tainty is the overriding factor influencing structure. And
Thompson (1967) goes even further to state that uncertainty
appears as the fundamental problem for complex organizations,
and coping with uncertainty as the essence of the administra-
tive process. Mintzberg (1979) relates degree of uncertainty
to static (low uncertainty) and dynamic (high uncertainty) en-
vironments. He states that dynamic environments will push or-
ganizations towards the organic type of structure with a stronger
force than static environments will push organizations towards
inorganic structures. In other words, an organization with
a high degree of information processing ability will survive,
perhaps at less than optimal efficiency, in a static environ-
ment where that information may not be necessary while an or-
ganization without that capability will not survive in a dynamic
environment where it is necessary.
The need to reduce uncertainty through information processing
can be satisfied in ways other than structural design modifications
29

For example, the establishment of slack resources or installa-
tion of a complex computer based information system are both
viable techniques for reducing uncertainty through increasing
the ability of the organization to process information. But
these alternatives are expensive and difficult to modify to
keep up with the dynamic environment they were developed to
buffer
.
In pure objective terms it is not possible to measure un-
certainty. It is easiest to study the various dimensions of
uncertainty and subjectively ascertain to what extent these
dimensions are present in the organization's environment.
Some of the dimensions of uncertainty are: standardization of
output; commonality and availability of inputs, both raw mater-
ials and personnel; routinization and repetition of subtasks
;
and clarity of organizational and divisional goals. The ex-
tent to which any of these dimensions are present determines
the degree to which uncertainty exists for an organization.
While no other environmental factor receives such universal
acceptance as uncertainty, there are other factors which do
exist and should be considered.
Davis and Lawrence (1977) list as a factor the presence
of external pressure requiring an organization to focus on more
than one aspect of its internal operations; e. g., external pres-
sure in the form of competition may force an organization to
focus on both cost efficiency and customer satisfaction. Khand-
walla (1977) states that successful organizations must provide
30

for sufficient planning, coordinating, and problem solving
mechanisms in their structure when outside pressures require
the pursuits of several goals simultaneously. The greater
the number of goals an organization pursues, the more difficult
it is for the organization to standardize procedures, maximize
goal accomplishment, and plan future activities.
Another factor which receives frequent mention as influ-
encing structural design is the type and degree of subtask in-
terdependence required for whole task completion. Thompson
(1967) has identified three types of interdependence: pooled,
sequential, and reciprocal. Pooled interdependence exists
when the tasks within different divisions are performed inde-
pendently utilizing resources shared between the divisions.
Sequential interdependence exists when the final product (task)
is the result of several subtasts being performed sequentially.
Subtasks build on subtasks until the whole task (product) is
completed. When the subtasks are shifted back and forth be-
tween work groups in various stages of development until the
whole task is completed, the type of interdependence is called
reciprocal. The greater the interdependence, regardless of
type, the greater the need for integrating and coordinating
mechanisms. Mintzberg (1979) and Duncan (1979) believe that
reciprocal interdependence requires the highest degree of in-
tegration. Khandwalla (1977) states more simply that the greater
the interdependence, regardless of type, the greater the need
for integrating mechanisms achieved through increased lateral
31

relations and more communication channels. Lorsch (1976) ar-
gues that interdependence is an internal environmental state
and that organizational structure must achieve a "balance be-
tween the needs of this internal state and the needs of the
external environmental state; e .g. , customer satisfaction.
The number of end-products whether they be services, tasks,
or products is a factor which should influence structural de-
sign. When the end-products are diverse, a more organic struc-
ture is needed to provide ample planning and integration
(Galbraith, 1977). According to Mintzberg (1979). organic is
defined as the absence of standardization within the organiza-
tion. While similar end-products lead to standardization, the
process of developing end-products which are highly diversified
is less able to be routinized and therefore requires more inte-
grating mechanisms which exist in organic structures (Khandwalla
,
1977).
The necessity to share resources between the functional
divisions of an organization is a situation which should also
influence organizational design (Davis and Lawrence, 1977).
When resources must be shared, a high degree of integration is
necessary to insure tasks are performed properly and in accord-
ance with organizational priorities rather than divisional
priorities.
A final factor to be considered is the importance of a
consistent effort from the organization. Consistent here means
that the management is aware of and able to pursue organizational
32

goals. Khandwalla (1977) emphasizes that there are two sets
of organizational goals - publicly stated long term goals and
privately directed short term goals. Often these goals are
quite different. Cyert and March (1965) argue that the pri-
vately directed short term goals are controlled by the managers
who make decisions for the organization. In organic structures
decisions and the reasons for those decisions are more widely
known throughout the organization than in inorganic structures
where decisions are often made at higher levels for reasons
which are not shared with the lower levels. Hence, the risk
of goal displacement, the pursuing of privately directed short
term goals in lieu of publicly stated long term goals is more
likely in organizations which have vague goals or are controlled
by an inorganic structure.
D. DESIGN SELECTION
Based on the foregoing discussion, the relationship between
environmental factors and operational performance first pre-
sented in figure 5. can now be represented in greater detail,
figure 8. The independent variables (internal and external
environmental factors) generally cannot be manipulated by the
organization. (One exception is when a Commanding Officer
lobbies to remove a vessel requirement due to time constraints.)
Instead, the existing factors are recognized and an appropriate
structural design is selected which will result in a sufficient
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and problem solving to allow the organization to achieve all
three performance criteria (the dependent variables).
According to Hall (1972) the specific form an organization
takes is dependent upon the environmental conditions it faces.
But before the basic question of which structural design to
choose for a particular organization can be answered, two prob-
lems remain to be solved. First, how does the organization
recognize and classify the environmental factors? Second, what
structure is most appropriate to deal with a particular set of
environmental factors? Since it is easiest, the second problem
will be resolved first.
Table 1 represents the five structural designs being con-
sidered in this thesis and a summary of the environmental fac-
tors in which they should theoretically flourish. Theorists
and practitioners of organizational structure have made it easy
to select a particular design given a particular set of envi-
ronmental conditions. The difficulty exists in placing the
conditions into a particular set.
The difficulty in classifying the environment of a given
organization is not easily resolved. The reason for the dif-
ficulty is that most of the dimensions of the environment are
relative terms; e.g., degree of uncertainty; degree of standard-
ization; goal clarity; number of rules and regulations; etc.
Some authors have attempted to simplify the problem through the




Relationship Between Environment to Structural Design
ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS
1. a) New, small company
b. Manager involved in all
processes and decisions
c) Few rules or regulations
d) Frequent adjustment of
procedures to find best
technique




















Low degree of uncertainty
Established firm
Diversified outputs
Stable but general goals
Sub-tasks require high degree
of training and expertise
Level of expertise determined
outside of the organization
Moderate to high degree of
uncertainty






Diversified markets or products
Clear operational goals





Any size firm but generally
young
Frequently changing goals
High degree of competition
Rapidly changing or modifying
products
High technology




Perrow (1970) first developed a matrix for classifying the
environment. He classified the environment into two sets of
dichotomies. The first set, based on the internal environment,
is categorized as simple or complex. The second set is based
upon the external environment and categorized as stable or
dynamic. Figure 9 displays this matrix and the types of or-
ganization structure related to each environmental category.
Duncan (1979) has gone one step further than most other
authors and has established an Organizational Design Decision
Tree based upon the two dichotomies developed by Perow. Figure
10 displays Duncan's decision model.
There is a common weakness to all attempts to model organi-
zational design decision theory. The authors universally seem
to dichotomize the dimensions of the environment which are
truly relative terms. Concepts such as centralization, com-
plexity, stability, etc. are more effectively utilized when
comparing one organization to another rather than comparing one
organization with its environment. This leaves the structural
designer with the following course of action: subjectively
categorize the environment and what factors are affecting it
and select a complimentary structure. If the performance cri-
teria are not accomplished with this goal the organization must
analyze whether to modify the structure, some other internal
process, or both in order to achieve the desired output.
The use of this technique for determining structural design















Perrow's Environment Classification Matrix
















Duncan's Structural Decision Model (slight personal modifications
to conform to Mintzberg's design alternatives)
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very important for the long terra success of the organization.
The concept is called morphogenesis which basically means the
ability of an organization structure to develop and change
form to meet changing conditions.
The value of a morphogenic structure is emphasized as a
result of two common situations. First is a situation where
a structure is designed to complement the perceived environment
and the result is unsuccessful. The second situation is when
a structure is selected to complement a perceived environment
and is successful until the environment changes. In both situ-
ations it may be necessary to modify the structural form. If
this form is so ingrained in the organization that it cannot
be adapted to fit new situations then the organization will
either die or perform less than optimally. A morphogenic struc-
ture which is adaptable over a wide range of environments will
help an organization achieve long term success.
In today's contemporary organization which employs more
sophisticated technology and more educated employees than in
years past, change will occur and must be met with many organi-
zational adaptations including frequent modifications to organ-
izational structure (Khandwalla, 1977).
In summary, when developing a structure for an organization,
the manager (s) must analyze the existing environmental factors
and select a structural design which provides for an adequate
degree of differentiation, integration, information processing,
and problem solving capacity. In addition, the design should
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ideally be flexible enough to be easily modified to react to




The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the activities
of the WMEC-270 both from the environmental factors that re-
quire them and the internal mechanisms used to control and
coordinate them. Since the WMEC-270 is not yet in operation
the analysis will be based primarily on the activities of ves-




According to the draft copy of the Logistics Support Plan
the WMEC-270 will be expected to perform the following peace-
time missions: Enforcement of Laws and Treaties (ELT) ; Search
and Rescue (SAR) ; Marine Science Activities (MSA) ; and Mili-
tary Preparedness (MP)
.
Activities within the ELT program can be placed in one of
two major divisions: decisions regarding fishing within the
200 mile contiguous zone of the United States and enforcement
of federal laws regarding smuggling (over the water) contra-
band such as narcotics, fire arms, etc. The successful con-
duct of these activities requires two contributions: prepar-
ation and execution.
Preparation for ELT activities involves key individuals
acting in highly professional manners. Generally the leader
of such activities; e.g., the Boarding Officer, has been through

several weeks of intensive training. He or she and a few others
in the boarding party must keep current on all the latest regu-
lations which outline policies and procedures and effectively
dictate the desired behavior of both the boarding party and
the base ship (in this case, the WMEC-270) . It is particularly
crucial that the Boarding Officer keep the Commanding Officer
appraised of current procedures as well as current surveillance
reports to which the Commanding Officer must respond. Without
constant preparation, successful execution could not occur.
The execution of ELT activities such as surveillance and
boarding operations could result in the development of many
scenarios; e.g., hot pursuit or boarding a hostile vessel.
Consequently, such activities require the attention of the
entire Coast Guard Cutter crew. Routine daily activities are
generally suspended during surveillance or boarding operations.
This is a period of intensive communication concerned with
monitoring the ELT activity and appraising the operational
commander ; e .g. , District commander, of actions being taken
and actions being contemplated. Those personnel who have the
responsibility for conducting the activities; e.g., the Com-
manding Officer and members of the boarding party, must com-
municate directly, must share the knowledge they possess, and
must act in accordance with that knowledge. There is no time
for research and review of procedures relating to boarding
and search. Success is dependent upon the decisions of those
people closest to the activity such as members of the boarding
k2

party. Decisions must "be made with little regard to the for-
mal chain of command.
Search and Rescue (SAR) activities are similar in intensity
to ELT activities. Most of the routine SAR tasks such as de-
termining search area, track spacing, etc., have been computer-
ized and are the responsibility of Rescue Coordination Centers
(RCC's) located throughout the United States and Puerto Rico.
Although these routine tasks are performed by the RCC's, the
ship (WMEC-270) is still required to train and be prepared to
accomplish these tasks as well as prepare for the actual search
execution through such activities as simulated search patterns,
coordinated air and surface exercise searches, and regular SAR
drills which result in message traffic only. The planning of
SAR activities requires a high degree of individual profession-
alism and interdivisional coordination between such divisions
as communications, bridge operations, combat information center
(CIC), deck, and weapons.
The execution of a SAR case is divided into two phases -
the search phase and the rescue phase. The search phase can
go on for days and while there is a continuing need for coor-
dination of subtasks, there is time to accomplish other tasks
unrelated to the SAR case and also to review procedures to in-
sure past and future decisions are in accordance with Coast
Guard policies. Should the search phase prove successful the
rescue phase would normally follow unless other units were pres-




The rescue phase is generally a period of intense activity.
A high degree of coordination and instant decision making are
required of many key personnel such as the Commanding Officer
and boat coxswains for the operation to be successful. Quick
and timely actions are essential. Members of the rescue team
must allow the existing conditions to influence their training;
and they must make decisions and take action based upon accepted
Coast Guard practices and situational necessity. The rescue
phase requires the utilization of the best and most experienced
personnel on board with little regard to rank or hierarchial
position.
Planning for Marine Environmental Protection activities
requires the attention of certain personnel who share numerous
other responsibilities. It is common for almost all shipboard
personnel to have the responsibility for more than one opera-
tional and administrative activity. MEP personnel must maintain
an awareness of current procedures; and must maintain frequent
liaison with other organizations more directly involved in
MEP such as Coast Guard Strike Teams and Coast Guard staff and
technical representatives working in the areas of MEP.
The execution of MEP activities can range from routine mon-
itoring of oil spills or potential oil spills to intensive
operations for preventing the spread and facilitating the clean-
up of hazardous chemicals. Often times during intensive oper-
ations the Coast Guard cutter is little more than a platform
from which cleanups are conducted using special equipment and
2+4

people made available to the cutter from other units. These
people often possess the technical skills necessary for suc-
cessful completion of the activity and because they are not
part of the cutter's chain of command, communications must flow
along nonstandard lines. Once again, the primary coordinator,
generally the Commanding Officer of the Coast Guard cutter,
must communicate directly with those persons on board with the
greatest expertise regardless of the established rank structure.
The Military Preparedness mission of the WMEC-270 requires
the continuous practice of several subactivities such as anti-
submarine warfare (ASW) , surveillance, and defensive anti-sur-
face warfare. The actual activities are rarely performed (Vietnam
and World War II being notable exceptions); but they are well
prepared for utilizing frequent rehearsals under simulated
conditions. Personnel such as the weapons and ASW officers are
highly trained and charged with the responsibility for keeping
the Commanding Officer and the entire vessel informed of new
procedures and any situation that would prohibit the vessel
from performing Military Preparedness activities.
An example of Marine Science Activities is recording tem-
peratures at various depths or taking ocean samples at specified
depths. These activities are less frequent and relatively low
key in comparison with other operational activities, but they
do follow a similar pattern of preparation and execution.
Preparation requires professional behavior from a few key per-
sonnel who must interact directly with the on board scientists
^5

or the activity sponsoring the particular set of Marine Science
Activities being planned next. The execution of these activi-
ties is short lived but requires a high degree of coordination
throughout the Coast Guard cutter to be successful. Again,
people must share their knowledge through open communication
with anyone who could be affected or could affect the planned
activity without regard to their position within the chain of
command.
B. ADDITIONAL ACTIVITIES
Besides planning for and executing these primary missions
there are many other activities which indirectly support mission
areas and must be performed regularly. These activities include:
personnel training, counseling, administration, routine vessel
maintenance and repair, and extensive vessel maintenance and
repair. Except during periods of intensive operations such as
a SAR case, these activities must be constantly coordinated
with primary mission areas.
Personnel training, counseling, and administration involves
all levels of the Coast Guard cutter. Just as the Commanding
Officer is responsible for the development of the officers on
board, the third class petty officers are responsible for the
development of the non-rated men and women subordinate to them.
To be effective, personnel considerations must be integrated
into every decision making process and every operational activ-
ity. Some examples include:
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1. pending personnel transfers should be considered
when planning future deployments of the vessel;
2. future operations should be considered as training
opportunities as well as unit performance opportunities;
3. personnel counseling should always occur following
a subordinate's attempt to perform in a new area and should be
periodically conducted on all subordinates regarding routine
performances
.
If a vessel hopes to attain long term operational success, these
personnel activities must be performed with regularity and the
same degree of professionalism afforded operational missions.
In addition to personnel activities, routine maintenance
and repair must be integrated into both short and long term
planning and decision making. Most maintenance and repair
activities are routine and intradepartmental. If these activi-
ties are not performed properly, the ability of the cutter to
perform primary missions will be threatened. These activities
will only be performed well if they are effectively integrated
with vessel operations.
Periods of extensive maintenance and repair are generally
scheduled well in advance so that operational missions will not
be affected by the inability of the ship to get underway. Con-
sequently, it is not necessary to coordinate extensive mainten-
ance and repair activities with operational missions except
when developing the vessel's operating schedule. It is neces-
sary however, to integrate the planning of major maintenance
^7

and repair work with the vessel's normal operating routine in
order to maximize the effective utilization of scheduled re-
pair work; e.g., vessel drydocking. Some elements of planned
maintenance and repair such as major ship alterations (SHIPALTS)
must be submitted a year or more in advance to insure that they
are included in the total work package. As the period for ex-
tensive maintenance and repair approaches, the planning and
scheduling of activities takes on a higher and higher priority.
The people most responsible for a successful maintenance and
repair period, such as the Engineering Officer or the Electron-
ics Material Officer, rise in relative importance within the
organization. They become the experts who assume or are given
the responsibility of sharing their knowledge and coordinating
the activities.
There is one more set of activities required of all Coast
Guard Cutters and the WMEC-270 will be no exception. The set
includes the planning and execution of routine and emergency
operational functions. Precision anchoring and navigation are
examples of routine operational functions while fire fighting
and flooding control are examples of emergency operational
functions. Some of the simpler tasks required for preparation
of these activities are controlled through established checkoff
lists; e.g., inspection of fire hoses and checking the accuracy
of the gyro and steering compasses. Other more complex tasks,
such as dropping the anchor require frequent rehearsals to co-
ordinate interdepartmental responsibilities. For the most part,
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these rehearsals require the involvement or at least the atten-
tion of all hands.
The actual execution of the routine operational functions
is very similar to the rehearsals with one notable exception -
a major error such as a missed navigational course change could
result in serious consequences; e.g., vessel grounding. For
the execution to be successful participants must behave in
accordance with their professional training with minor situ-
ational adjustments necessitated by uncontrolled and unplanned
factors such as the presence of another vessel or the absence
of an expected navigational aid. During these functions, the
Commanding Officer must maintain as many communication channels
as possible while maintaining full awareness of the environment
surrounding his or her vessel. Large quantities of information
must be processed quickly and accurately by the Commanding Offi-
cer as well as other key participants such as the navigator and
the officer of the deck. Information flow cannot be limited to
official channels because the channels could become overloaded
resulting in blocking or restricting changes to important
conditions.
The behavior desired during execution of emergency functions
is approximately the same as the behavior that the rehearsals
attempt to create. Unfortunately the conditions surrounding
the actual emergency are far different from the conditions
experienced in the rehearsals. Fire fighting is generally not
practiced in the presence of real fire and deadly smoke, nor
^9

is flooding control rehearsed while standing in two feet of
water with more coming into the compartment. Besides these
conditions there is one other major factor which distinguishes
the execution of emergency operational functions from both the
rehearsal of emergency operational function and the execution
of routine operational functions - mistakes are measured in
terms of their resulting effect on the situation, and even
minor memory lapses or short delays in decision making can
have disastrous results.
During emergency operations the role of the Commanding
Officer is often minimized. Decision making shifts to those
persons closest to the action who have the greatest amount of
information. For example, the head of a repair party is close
to the action and the ultimate success of the vessel rests on
the ability of the repair party head to assess the situation
and take appropriate action based upon both his or her profes-
sional training and the existing conditions.
C. ACTIVITY CLASSIFICATIONS
Depending upon the degree of operational intensity and the
degree of interdepartmental coordination required, the activi-
ties of a WMEC-270 can be grouped into three categories. The
first group (Group I activities), I will categorize intense
inport activities, requires a high degree of intensity but a
low degree of coordination. These activities include vessel
drydocking, dockside availability and other scheduled mainten-





Routine inport and underway activities are represented in
the second category (Group II activities). This group requires
moderate degrees of intensity and moderate degrees of coordin-
ation. Included in this group are non-scheduled maintenance
and repair activities, Marine Science Activities, planning
activities for all other mission areas, and routine operational
functions such as navigation and precision anchoring.
The third group (Group III activities), is categorized as
requiring a high degree of intensity and a high degree of inter-
departmental coordination. Activities in this group include
all missions (except MSA listed in the above group) and emer-
gency operational functions.
In addition to operational intensity and interdepartmental
coordination each group possesses other characteristics that
distinguish one group from another. Those characteristics
which relate to the environmental factors identified in Chap-
ter III and outlined in figure 8 will now be discussed with
respect to their presence within each of the groups of activities
The first factor (considered by many authors to be the most
important) is degree of uncertainty. Some dimensions of un-
certainty already discussed includes standardization of output,
commonality and availability of inputs, routinization and re-
petition or sub-tasks, and clarity of organizational and
divisional goals. In overall uncertainty Group I activities
rate low, Group II rate moderate, and Group III rate high for
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of information processing are required for tasks within each
of the groups. Group I activities require the lowest level
of information processing while Group III activities require
the highest level of information processing.
Another environmental factor already identified as impact-
ing on organizational design considerations is external pres-
sures. Specifically this factor refers to how many different
external pressures influence the internal emphasis placed on
unit activities. The- WMEC-270 is controlled first by the Com-
mander of the District where it is operating, second by Comman-
der of the District where it is homeported, third by the
2Commander of the Area in which it is operating, and fourth
by the Commandant of the Coast Guard. All of these sources
of control can exert external pressure on the vessel to con-
centrate on particular activities of concern. Also, within
a source of control there are multiple sources of external
pressures such as personnel, military readiness, and engineer-
ing. Each of these divisions within a District or at Head-
quarters will attempt to influence which WMEC-270 activities
should get the most attention. As the degree of influence
changes, the WMEC-270 must be able to respond with internal
shifts in emphasis without totally disrupting other operational
activities. These multiple external pressures are particularly
2
The Area Commander could be the primary source of control
if the vessel is operating beyond the boundary of any District
Commander or the vessel is assigned to the control of an Area
Commander for a specific operation.
5^

noticeable with Group II activities which involve long range
planning of a wide variety of mission requirements and admin-
istrative support tasks.
Interdependence is another environmental factor which
should influence structural design. During scheduled periods
of maintenance and repair (Group I activities) there is very
little interdependence between divisions and departments. As
a general rule, each department would schedule its activities
and accomplish its tasks with a minimum of assistance or in-
teraction with the other departments. Routine underway and
inport activities (Group II) require a moderate degree of in-
terdependence. Each department must share its resources, money,
time, people, etc. with other departments and coordinate its
activities so that the maximum amount of planning, training,
and preventive maintenance can occur with a minimum of disrup-
tion. Those tasks which require a high degree of intensity
(Group III activities) also require a high degree of interde-
pendence. If success is to be the outcome (lives often depend
on a successful outcome) then all departments must be committed
to the task at hand. In addition, the department's committment
to the task must be coordinated with other department efforts
to support the whole task. Without proper input from one de-
partment such as weapons, the input of another department such
as operations will be futile.
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Another environmental factor which should be considered as
a possible influence of structural design is the number of dis-
tinct units of output. Characteristics of these output units
include: output is related to specific task or mission, the
output is required and monitored by external sources, and the
people involved must be able to clearly identify that the out-
put is complete. Some examples of units of output are: engine
overhaul, SAR case, fire extinguishment, quarterly report, and
reenlistment interviews. Some examples of completed tasks which
are not considered units of output are: disciplinary and con-
gratulatory counseling, submission of non-required correspon-
dence, and routine preventive maintenance. Group I activities
have limited and clearly defined outputs. Intensive inport
periods are normally scheduled for a specific purpose such as
main engine overhaul or drydocking; and when they're not, tasks
with specific outcomes are scheduled for the period; e.g., re-
finishing the main deck. These outputs directly support mission
accomplishment, are required and monitored both internally and
externally, and are clearly identifiable as finished products
when completed. Routine inport and underway activities (Group
II) contain many clearly defined outputs such as submission of
required reports and conduct of specified training. Group II
activities also include many ongoing tasks without clearly de-
fined outcomes such as personnel performance counseling, in-
doctrination of new work group members, dealing with matters
relating to military civil rights, and conduct of routine
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maintenance and repair. For most of the activities in this
group it is difficult to ascertain when the old tasks end and
the new tasks begin. This is a sharp contrast to Group III
activities which possess easily identified beginning and end
points. For example, a fire marks the beginning of an emer-
gency; its extinguishment and cleanup mark the end. The dif-
ficulty with Group III activities is determining the success
of the outcome. The search phase of a SAR case may be performed
perfectly by a Coast Guard vessel and still not result in a
completed rescue. To label the effort successful would be in-
accurate; to label the effort unsuccessful would be unfair.
As another example, how fast must a fire be extinguished for
the effort to be labeled as successful? Essentially, both the
quantity and quality of outputs from Group I activities can
easily be determined; Group II activities include many tasks
without clear outputs; and the quality of Group III activity
outputs can best be determined through subjective judgement on
the part of observers or investigators such as the Commanding
Officer or District staff personnel.
Another environmental factor to be considered when devel-
oping a structural design is the degree to which resources are
shared. Time, manpower, and money are examples of the resources
of concern in this environmental factor. There is little sharing
of these resources for Group I activities. Funding for inten-
sive maintenance and repair tasks is generally a high priority
and would not suffer during normal budget allocation exercises.
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Time for performing these tasks is normally incorporated di-
rectly into the operating schedule so conflicts will be min-
imized. Each department performs its functions with a minimum
of manpower assistance from the other departments. Funding
for Group II activities is not a high priority and a great
deal of interdepartmental cooperation is necessary to insure
that available funds are shared. Group II activities have what-
ever time is left after scheduled Group I activities and un-
scheduled Group III activities; and this available time must
be shared between such Group II activities as routine mainten-
ance and repair, training for Group III activities, and planning
for Group I activities. Successful completion of Group II
activities would not be possible without a high degree of man-
power resource sharing between departments. Once a Group III
activity is initiated, funding is not a concern to the vessel.
All available physical resources will be utilized to overcome
the emergency. Time is also not a factor. (In some Search and
Rescue cases both time and funding do act as constraints after
a few days of searching with negative results.) Manpower is
extensively shared during Group III activities. Boat crews
and repair parties are comprised of personnel from all depart-
ments. With the exception of watchstanders, virtually all
crew members are made available to assist the vessel in mount-
ing any intensive operation.
A final environmental factor which could influence struc-
tural design is the risk of goal displacement. In this context,
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risk has two dimensions. First, the risk that the organizational
goals can "become secondary to the unit's goals. Second, the
severity of the impact on the organization if such goal dis-
placement occurs. Group I activities have a low possibility
of displacement and also rates low in severity if such displace-
ment occurred. Since so many tasks are being performed simul-
taneously during Group II activities there is a high chance
of goal displacement. For example, the Commanding Officer
could easily develop a prioritization of routine inport and
underway activities by the way he or she rewarded and evaluated
subordinates. In general, the severity of this displacement
is not very great. There is so much monitoring of cutter re-
sponsibilities that tasks which held a low priority for any
duration of time would be identified and forced into a higher
priority category by external sources such as the district
inspection team. Group III activities normally occur one at
a time with long time lapses in between. They are very visible
activities and desired outcomes are common knowledge throughout
the unit and the operational command. Consequently, like Group
I activities, the risk of goal displacement is small; but,
unlike Group I activities, the degree of severity if displace-
ment does occur is very high. For example, if the Commanding
Officer decides to send an unarmed boarding party to inspect
a recreational vessel which happens to be heavily armed and
smuggling narcotics, the consequences could be very damaging
to the boarding party and the Coast Guard as well as the
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Commanding Officer. Likewise, if the on-scene leader decides
to fight a fire using a personally developed approach rather
than the standard rehearsed method, the results could "be chaos,
lives lost, and a severely damaged unit. Essentially, Group
I activities have a low risk of goal displacement and low im-
pact if such severity occurs; Group II activities have a high
risk of occurrence and a moderate impact; while Group III activ-
ities have a low risk of occurrence combined with a high impact
if goal displacement does occur.
Table 3 summarizes the environmental factors that exist
for each of the three activity groupings. Chapter V will dis-
cuss the organizational design which best fits these environ-
mental factors; but as a final element of this chapter, the
existing structural design used to control the operational
activities needs clarification. Since the WMEC-270 is not
yet in commission, the discussion will center on the structural
design commonly established on similar classes of vessels such
as the WMEC-210 and WHEC-378.
D. ACTIVITY CONTROL
Chapter II identified the top levels of the shipboard or-
ganizational design. As addressed in Coast Guard regulations,
the Executive Officer and all department heads have the author-
ity and responsibility to report directly to the Commanding
Officer on all matters pertaining to shipboard operations.









Uncertainty Low Moderate High
External
Pressures Few Many Few
Interdependence Low Moderate High
























or senior petty officers report to the Commanding Officer through
their respective department heads as well as the Executive Of-
ficer. Department heads and division officers report directly
to the Executive Officer on matters pertaining to shipboard
administration and budget which are the Executive Officer's
primary areas of concern as specified by Coast Guard regula-
tions. Meetings below the department head level are normally
intradepartmental unless they involve the passing of informa-
tion downwards - general policy statements, Commanding Officer's
concerns, and ship's schedule. In essence, the Commanding
Officer, Executive Officer, and department heads coordinate the
interdepartmental activities and plan major ship activities;
individual department heads coordinate interdivisional activi-
ties and plan intradepartmental activities.
Voluminous rules and regulations are the primary mechanism
used to control behavior and to insure that individuals are
working towards organizational goals. Fitness reports are used
to evaluate officers on their ability to comply with rules and
regulations and to influence behavior in areas not covered by
explicit policies. Both the preparing and reporting officer
for the fitness report have the opportunity to influence be-
havior through this mechanism. With the exception of him or
herself, the Commanding Officer is the reporting officer for
all officers on board the vessel. The Executive Officer pre-
pares fitness reports for all department heads who in turn
prepare the reports for their division officers. Enlisted
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personnel are also controlled to some degree by their semi-
annual evaluations submitted through the chain of command from
their immediate supervisor to the Commanding Officer. Enlisted
personnel also seek favorable endorsements on advancement re-
commendations and transfer requests.
The performance of the vessel itself is monitored and con-
trolled by the District Commander, Area Commander, and Coast
Guard Headquarters through many different mechanisms. The
most common control devices at all levels are rules and regula--.
tions issued primarily in the form of Coast Guard Publications,
Commandant Instructions, Area Instructions, and District In-
structions. In addition, Coast Guard Headquarters uses Com-
mand selection boards and officer and enlisted assignment poli-
cies to insure top level qualifications; Areas use inspections
and visits as well as imposing periodic training requirements
on the vessel; and Districts use bi-annual inspections, regu-
lar visits, required periodic training, and conferences invol-
ving the unit commanding officers and District staff officers
in an effort to monitor and control the behavior (performance)
of the vessel.
The vessel and the Commanding Officer are evaluated by the
District commander while the vessel itself is additionally mon-
itored and evaluated by the Area commander. Evaluation is both
objective and subjective. Objective evaluation is based upon
quantitative scores assigned to such activities as gunnery
exercises, refresher training, and ratio of days underway to
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days scheduled to be underway. The subjective evaluation is
based upon factors such as comments by District and Area staff
personnel concerning their relationship with the vessel, appear-
ance of the vessel during inspections and visits, lack of noto-
riety with respect to courts-martials, serious injuries, collisions,
etc. and a positive public image associated with accomplishments
such as successful SAR cases, drug busts, or seizure of foreign
fishing vessels.
Formal downward communications between Coast Guard Head-
quarters, Area and District staffs, and the vessel flows from
various staff components directly to the Commanding Officer.
Upwards communications flows in reverse; correspondence is
signed by the Commanding Officer for operational matters and
the Executive Officer by direction of the Commanding Officer
for administrative and budget matters. Correspondence from
the vessel is addressed to specific staff components rather
than the District or Area Commander directly. The staff com-
ponents would advise the District or Area Commander or Coast
Guard Commandant only on issues of major importance. The major
function of the communications to the vessel is to influence
performance by requiring specific procedures and modifying
existing regulations. Communications from the vessel has two
primary purposes: to provide input for new policy formulation
and to report on compliance to other requests and requirements.
In summary, the WMEC-270 has many operational and operational
support missions such as military readiness and routine maintenance
6^

and repair. These missions can be grouped into three categor-
ies of activities based upon the degree of intensity and the
degree of coordination required. Certain environmental char-
acteristics, important to organizational design considerations
can then be attached to each of the groupings. Internally,
operational activities are planned and coordinated through
meetings involving (normally) the Commanding Officer, the Exe-
cutive Officer, and the department heads. Performance is con-
trolled or influenced through the issuance of shipboard policies
and regulations and semi-annual evaluations conducted on all
personnel except the Commanding Officer. Externally, the oper-
ational activities are planned and coordinated through periodic
meetings between the vessel Commanding Officer and the district
staff personnel and through the formal scheduling of major activ-
ities such as law enforcement patrols and yard availabilities.
Performance is controlled and influenced through the issuance
of standard rules and regulations, through the development of
training standards, through personnel assignment policies, and
through semi-annual evaluations of the Commanding Officer.
Although there is some informal communication between the
vessel's department heads, division officers and the staff ele-
ments of the District, Area, and Headquarters, virtually all
formal communication flows up or down through the Commanding
Officer. This is the key position that is primarily respon-
sible for the effectiveness for the vessel or primarily respon-
sible for the ineffectiveness of the vessel.
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All of these patterns of communication, evaluation, and
control mechanisms comprise the methods by which vessels of
a similar class as the WMEC-270 organize, execute, and control
their operational requirements. These methods have been in
existence for many years and are expected to be used by the
new WMEC-270 as they have in the past been used by other WMEC '
s
and WHEC's. Whether this conventional organizational structure




V. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN APPLICATIONS
As a preliminary to determining which structural design
is most appropriate for the WMEC-270 given the environment with-
in which the vessel operates, it is important to classify the
structure in effect on most Coast Guard vessels and the loca-
tion of that structure within the organizational design of the
entire Coast Guard. One of the five design types, Simple,
Machine Bureaucracy, Professional Bureaucracy, Divisionalized,
and Adhocracy, will be used to categorize the existing struc-
ture and to recommend the desired structure.
A. EXISTING STRUCTURE
The present structure possesses various design parameters
related to formalization, specialization, centralization, work
grouping, etc. The five classes of structural design also
possess specific design parameters which separate the dynamic
processes of one structure from another. To match the present
structure with one of Mintzberg' s five design types, the param-
eters unique to each design must be identified and then matched
with the parameters possessed by the existing structure.
The main design parameters of the Simple structure are
centralization and organic structure. Centralization requires
the consolidation of decision making power in the hands of a
single person at the top of the organization. Organic structure
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is most simply defined as the absence of standardization in
the organization. (Mintzberg, 1979) Neither of these param-
eters exist on today's Coast Guard vessels. Personnel manage-
ment provides a good example of the lack of decision making
power on board the vessel. Crew members are transferred in
and out of the organization with only occasional input from
the vessel. Standardization, influenced through training and
the adoption of standard operating procedures, has a strong
presence throughout all Coast Guard vessels.
Training, horizontal job specialization, vertical decentral-
ization, and horizontal decentralization are the main design
parameters of the Professional Bureaucracy. Training refers
to the development of a complex set of skills. Horizontal job
specialization means the reduction of large tasks into smaller
subtasks. Vertical decentralization is concerned with the
delegation of decision making power down the chain of authority.
And, horizontal decentralization is concerned with the shift
of power from line managers to staff and technical specialists.
(Mintzberg, 1979) The first two elements, training and hori-
zontal job specialization, are certainly present on board Coast
Guard vessels. But, horizontal decentralization is present only
in a limited degree while vertical decentralization is almost
nonexistent.
The Divisionalized form is a design used to describe the
large organizations that produce diversified products or work
with diversified client types. There are clear distinctions
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between divisions (generally geographic dispersal) and a cer-
tain degree of autonomy afforded each of the divisions (Mintz-
berg, 1979) • While this structure might be appropriate to
describe the entire Coast Guard with its variety of missions
and operating units, it is not an appropriate design for de-
scribing the present vessel structure; nor will it be consid-
ered as a design alternative when attempting to determine the
desired structure later in this chapter.
Characteristics of an Adhocracy are: highly organic struc-
ture, with little formalization of behavior; high horizontal
job specialization based on formal training; a tendency to group
the people in functional units but use them as needed through-
out the organization; reliance on liaison devices for coordin-
ation; and selective decentralization. The primary purpose
of this structural form is to break away from established pat-
terns of standardization and create an environment where inno-
vation, the development and implementation of new ideas, can
flourish. (Mintzberg, 1979) With the Coast Guard's emphasis
on standardization through the establishment of rules, regula-
tions, and standard operating procedures, the Adhocracy can be
eliminated as an accurate description of the present vessel
structure.
Behavior formalization, vertical and horizontal job special-
ization, usually functional grouping, large size, vertical cen-
tralization, limited horizontal decentralization, and heavy
emphasis on action planning are the main design parameters of
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the Machine Bureaucracy (Mintzberg, 1979) • The extent to which
rules, regulations, specialized training, and periodic evalu-
ations exist determines the degree to which behavior formaliza-
tion exists. There should be little argument that a very strong
effort is made throughout the Coast Guard to formalize behavior
at all levels. Some examples include: basic training, boarding
and law enforcement schools, and leadership and management
schools
.
Coast Guard regulations specify the job requirements of the
top level crew such as the Commanding Officer, Executive Officer,
department heads, and certain division officers. Planned main-
tenance systems describe the specific job requirements for
certain tasks. First line supervisors normally break the larger
tasks down into subtasks assigned to individuals on a daily
basis. There are even some specific individuals trained and
designated to perform specific support tasks; e.g., repair of
refrigeration system and maintenance of radar system. These
are all examples of horizontal job specialization. Vertical
job specialization is also very apparent in the hierarchial
structure of Coast Guard vessels: besides performing their
own work, those higher in the organization administer and mon-
itor the work for those below.
While there are some special project committees that have
representation from various functions, the major divisional
groupings and career paths are based upon functional skills
such as the electricians and the cooks (subsistence specialists).
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The WMEC-270 is not particularly large in terms of number
of people but it is a complex organization in terms of number
of subunits and number of activities conducted. And many of
the vessel's activities such as personnel selection, operating
schedule, and performance evaluation are performed by persons
outside the basic organization. If these persons and the ves-
sel's full range of activities are included, the organizational
size is sufficiently large enough to be suitable for control
by a Machine Bureaucracy.
In recent years there has been a strengthening of formal
power at the top as opposed to dispersal of power down the chain
of authority. To avoid abuse of power, lower level supervisors
are limited in the power they can exercise over their subor-
dinates. Even the Commanding Officer, the lone administrator
of nonjudicial punishment on the vessel has his or her proceed-
ings reviewed automatically by the District legal staff to in-
sure proper use of power. In the Coast Guard it is common
practice to hold people, not organizational systems, ultimately
responsible for the success or failure of an operating unit.
As long as this practice continues, vertical centralization
is likely to remain in most areas of authority.
Limited horizontal decentralization, the dispersal of power
to staff and technical elements, does exist at Coast Guard
Headquarters, Area offices, and District offices; and the vessel
operations are influenced by this existence. Some examples
include the imposition of procedural requirements on the vessel
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by District staff elements such as personnel and comptroller
even though these divisions are not in the normal chain of
authority "between the vessel and the District Commander. So,
while the Chief of Personnel has no formal authority over the
vessel or its Commanding Officer, he or she can control many
of the personnel activities on board the vessel through the
establishment of district personnel policies.
Action planning does receive a heavy emphasis at both the
level of the vessel and at other levels higher within the Coast
Guard. There is a heavier emphasis at the lower levels such
as the vessel where normal job lengths (tours) rarely exceed
24 months. At the level of Coast Guard Headquarters where tour
lengths frequently reach 48 months there is relatively less
emphasis on action planning.
The present vessel structure matches most closely with the
description of the Machine Bureaucracy with some of the design
parameters influenced by Coast Guard units other than the vessel;
e.g., horizontal decentralization is imposed on the vessel by
District, Area, and Headquarter ' s staff and technical personnel.
It is also important to note that the vessel is an operating
unit engaged almost exclusively in mission accomplishment or
activities which support mission accomplishment. Virtually
everyone on board the vessel from the Commanding Officer to the
dishwashers is performing a function dictated by standard poli-
cies and procedures established for the vessel not by the vessel.
The management functions that are being performed on the vessel
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are all related to supervision to accomplish assigned tasks.
Thus, the vessel, in its present state, can best be described
as a purely operating unit controlled by a Machine Bureaucracy.
There are conditions where the Machine Bureaucracy is the
most effective organizational design. As stated in Chapter
III, these conditions include stable and simple environment,
low degree of uncertainty, high degree of repetition and rou-
tineness, limited number of outputs, and low risk of goal dis-
placement. As outlined in Chapter IV, Coast Guard vessels
operate under these conditions only during Group I activities.
But for a new class of vessel such as the WMEC-270, these con-
ditions may not even exist for Group I activities until they
have been performed several times. The Machine Bureaucracy
may be the desireable end structure for these activities after
they have been performed several times over the first few years
of the vessel's life, but it probably is undesireable as an
initial point of departure.
The higher degree of complexity and uncertainty and the
lower degrees of routineness and repetition for Group II and
Group III activities make the appropriateness of the Machine
Bureaucracy questionable at best for any Coast Guard vessel
and certainly inappropriate for a new and highly sophisticated
vessel such as the WMEC-270.
B. ALTERNATIVE STRUCTURES
Since three unique groups of activities have been identified,
a recommended optimal structure for controlling each of the
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groups will be determined followed "by a recommended optimal
structure for controlling all of the groups collectively.
1 . Group I Activities
For controlling Group I activities (intensive inport
activities), the Simple structure is recommended. As previously
discussed, the main design parameters of the Simple structure
include centralization and organic structure (Mintzberg, 1979)
•
Centralization means that information flows to and from the
top, in this case the Commanding Officer, where activities are
controlled and decisions are made. Burns and Stalker (1966)
labeled the organic structure and identified its characteris-
tics which include:
a. the contributive nature of special knowledge and
experience to the common task of the concern;
b. the "realistic" nature of the individual task,
which is seen as set by the total situation of the concern;
c. the adjustment and continual redefinition of in-
dividual tasks through interaction with others;
d. the spread of commitment to the concern beyond any
technical definition;
e. a network structure of control, authority, and
communication. The sanctions which apply to the individual's
conduct in his or her working role derive more from presumed
community of interest with the rest of the working organiza-
tion in the survival and growth of the firm, and less from a
contractual relationship between the individual and a non-per-




a content of communication which consists of infor-
mation and advice rather than instructions and decisions;
g. commitment to the concern's tasks and to the "tech-
nological ethos" of material progress and expansion is more
highly valued than loyalty and obedience.
There are two unique features of Group I activities that per-
mit control by the Commanding Officer. First, when these activ-
ities occur, there are very few distractions requiring the
immediate attention of the Commanding Officer. This permits
him or her to be actively involved in all decision making.
Second, time is generally not a critical factor in decision
making during Group I activities. This again permits the Com-
manding Officer to be fully involved in controlling the activ-
ities. The primary benefit of the organic structure is that
ranking personnel; i.e., E-6 and above, will be able to share
their expertise, experience, and professional advice directly
with the Commanding Officer without fear of reprisal. Every
effort would be made to keep communication channels open with
more emphasis on professional expertise than rank. While the
Commanding Officer would be expected to make all the decisions
for this group of activities, all the latest data would be pro-
vided to him or her from subordinates as well as from super-
visors and staff and technical experts in District offices and
Headquarters who maintain regular contact with the Commanding
Officer in regard to intensive inport activities such as yard
availabilities. Another advantage of the Simple structure for
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controlling these activities in that it can easily evolve into
the Machine Bureaucracy already established as the appropriate
structure for these activities once they have become routin-
ized. This evolution is easy because of the direct access of
the Commanding Officer to those people at District and Head-
quarters who promulgate official policy and because of the
authority of the Commanding Officer to issue rules and regula-
tions for areas not already covered by existing regulations
issued by higher authority.
2. Group II Activities
There are too many simultaneous operations occurring
during Group II activities (routine inport and underway activ-
ities) to permit the personal involvement of the Commanding
Officer in every decision making process. Following the guide-
lines of Chapter III the Professional Bureaucracy provides
the best alternative structure. Although there is a great deal
of complexity involved in coordinating and completing these
activities, there is also a great deal of stability; e.g.,
there is a high degree of repetition involved in such activ-
ities as quarterly reports, monthly reports, reenlistment in-
terviews, planned maintenance check-offs, and getting the
vessel underway. The main design parameters of the Professional
Bureaucracy include heavy emphasis on training, horizontal job
specialization, horizontal decentralization, and vertical de-
centralization (Mintzberg, 1979) • The Professional Bureaucracy
consists basically of an operating core controlled by individuals
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specially trained and well qualified to perform in the job to
which assigned. Some examples of the training emphasis are
the Boarding and Law Enforcement Officer's attendance at Board-
ing and Law Enforcement School and the Damage Control Assistant's
attendance at Damage Control School. The on-the-job performance
of both of these people is strongly influenced by the training
they received at the respective schools, and both are probably
more knowledgeable in their particular fields than any other
member of the vessel's crew. One of the features of the Pro-
fessional Bureaucracy is that these trained persons will main-
tain frequent contact with other professionals in the field and
incorporate the latest developments that have been found to be
more successful in certain situations than previous practices.
Many of the major tasks of the WMEC-270 have over time
developed into a group of specialized subtasks in order to
improve productivity and reduce the necessary skill level.
This procedure is essentially horizontal job specialization.
There are many examples of this type of job specialization.
First is a towing operation which consists of the WMEC-270
coming along side another vessel and passing the towing hawser
to the disabled vessel. In this operation the best helmsman
is generally at the wheel, three specific methods for passing
the line are prepared with the best personnel assigned to each
position - one person would not be expected to handle all three
techniques for accomplishing the same task. At the same time,
other crew members are engaged in related subtasts which
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individually provide very little but collectively support the
successful completion of the whole task. A second example
involves the fire fighting training. One person handles plot-
ting while another communicates with the bridge, and still an-
other communicates with the repair party. Each person performs
a specialized task which makes the whole task easier to under-
stand and control. The third and final example involves the
establishment of certain specialized jobs within the command
such as the education officer and the drug and alcohol counse-
lor. While these functions could easily be the responsibility
of each supervisor with respect to his or her subordinates, the
functions are instead performed by single individuals who stay
current on all the policies and procedures related to the par-
ticular job; e.g., education.
These first two design parameters, training and hori-
zontal job specialization, are already operating characteristics
of the organizational structure currently being used on Coast
Guard vessels. To convert from the present Machine Bureaucracy
to the desired Professional Bureaucracy, the emphasis on train-
ing needs to be increased to properly support the structure.
(It is interesting to note that the Commandant of the Coast
Guard has recently made training the top priority. Commandant's
Bulletin, 5-81) The remaining two design parameters, horizontal
and vertical decentralization, provide for the major distinctions
between the Machine and the Professional Bureaucracy.
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As discussed earlier, horizontal decentralization in-
volves the shifting of power from line to staff and technical
elements. Although ranking shipboard personnel do not carry
these distinctions, Headquarters and District and Area office
personnel do possess this distinction. Horizontal decentrali-
zation can be accomplished by formally opening the communica-
tion channels between staff and technicians outside the vessel
and those personnel inside the vessel organization who have
been delegated by the Commanding Officer to have the respon-
sibility for executing the staff and technical directives.
Opening these official lines of communication would greatly
enhance the power of the staff and technicians who would be
able to influence the behavior of the people most involved in
their programs and would provide more accurate and timely feed-
back on the success of program modifications. The development
of horizontal decentralization offers many advantages such as:
closer contact between the developer and the user of specific
programs; more accurate information flowing up and down because
the user would not be reluctant to pass on "bad news" to some-
one outside the vessel hierarchy not involved formally in his
or her performance evaluation; and the amount of time the Com-
manding Officer and other senior officers on the vessel spend
discussing minor program modifications with District, Area,
and Headquarters personnel would be greatly reduced, thus per-
mitting these key people to be more involved in monitoring and
influencing the overall effectiveness of the vessel and coor-
dinating the many activities.
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Vertical decentralization is concerned with the dele-
gation of decision making power down the chain of authority
(Mintzberg, 1979) • Vertical decentralization can range from
no lower level decision making power to total autonomy for
decision making at the supervisor level. For the Professional
Bureaucracy, vertical decentralization is closely related to
the training parameter previously discussed. The expectation
is that persons brought into the system are fully trained and
indoctrinated in the work requirements and then given consid-
erable control over that work. The extent to which the training
expectation is true determines the extent to which control over
work is delegated. For example, a new Engineering Officer or
Chief Petty Officer may be granted considerable work control
due to the extent of training and experience in his or her
career; a new Ensign or Junior Petty Officer may require several
months of close observation and evaluation feedback to establish
the desired level of expertise prior to being delegated decision
making power. The people who have received delegated decision
making authority are expected to upgrade their level of exper-
tise by staying current on all new developments in their re-
spective fields. Changes of major significance would be brought
to the attention of the Commanding Officer who would otherwise
act as the primary coordinating and evaluating mechanism for
all required activities. As a professional, the Commanding
Officer would also be responsible for improving his or her man-
agement and motivational skills.
80

Establishment of a Professional Bureaucracy will re-
quire some changes to the internal and external patterns of
communications, evaluation, and control. Communications flow
down to key persons; e.g., department heads and division offi-
cers, from two main sources. The Commanding Officer would pass
down personal policies, areas of concern, and future plans.
District, Area, and Headquarters staff and technical elements
would pass down instructions and recommendations for task ac-
complishment. This latter information would by-pass the Com-
manding Officer except that major policy and procedural changes
will be brought to the attention of the Commanding Officer.
Evaluations would still be performed primarily by the Commanding
Officer who will permit greater influence from staff and tech-
nical elements and less influence from hierarchial levels; e.g.,
a division officer would be evaluated less on how he or she
supported the department and more on how he or she converted
professional training and experience into benefits for the ves-
sel. Control over activities would be accomplished through
lateral relations between people involved in the various activ-
ities. People determined to be weak would undergo additional
training to upgrade professional stature. Programs determined
to be weak would be given special emphasis to upgrade vessel
performance. Staff and technical people would develop a closer
relationship with vessel personnel who are new on the job or
observed as needing closer supervision and more distant rela-
tionships with the more qualified people who have generally
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been on the job for a longer period of time. Periodic reports
would still be submitted on a routine basis and would continue
to be useful in monitoring and controlling the vessel's
performance.
3. Group III Activities
Based strictly on the environmental factors already
identified as deserving consideration when designing organi-
zations, the Adhocracy would be the optimum structure for con-
trolling Group III activities (emergency operations). The high
degree of intensity, high need for extensive coordination, and
the unique nature of each emergency situation make the Adhocracy
the preferred controlling structure. The Adhocracy has many
similarities to the Professional Bureaucracy such as decentral-
ization and emphasis on highly trained professional personnel,
and to the Simple structure such as organic. But, the major
advantages of the Adhocracy lie in its differences from all
other organizational designs. The major difference is that
it encourages and prefers innovation over standardization.
All other structures attempt to develop standardization through
such devices as training, rules and regulations, and direct
supervision. The Adhocracy uses standardized training as a
base from which to draw knowledge and skills for the purpose
of developing new knowledge and skills. There are few situa-
tions where the Adhocracy would be effective without creating
chaos. Group III activities represent one of those situations
for the following reasons.
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First, each emergency situation is unique with differ-
ent factors deserving consideration and concern. For example,
one fire may have similar characteristics but these similari-
ties are not as important as the differences which might include
location with respect to ammunition and fuel storage, number
of personnel presently endangered, and the types of equipment
available for fighting the fire. It is unlikely that all the
possible contingencies could be planned for through training
exercises. Consequently, innovation - the development and
application of new methods - becomes very important.
A second reason for controlling Group III activities
with an Adhocracy involves formal communications. During in-
tense emergencies there are often breaks in normal channels of
communication. This could require independent actions from
people normally accustomed to responding to specific situations
and instructions. A rescue and assistance team on board an-
other vessel, for example, may be highly trained to handle emer-
gencies while able to communicate with the base ship and receive
specific instructions. Once the communications are broken, the
team must be able to rely on its own training and experience
rather than on standard operating procedures to adapt to unique
circumstances.
A third reason is that when an emergency activity is
begun there is no clear picture of what the finished product
should or would look like. Consequently, decisions are made
in a manner which does not relate the present state to some
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future state. While some alternative outcomes may be consid-
ered, decisions are based primarily on the present state and
all the factors involved in that state.
A fourth and final reason to be discussed for preferring
the Adhocracy for controlling Group III activities is the avail-
ability of personnel during an emergency situation. It is
very rare that all personnel would be available to perform their
assigned functions during an emergency. Crew members can be
on leave or liberty, not available for duty (sick), or casual-
ties of the emergency. Following standard procedures in such
situations can only produce delays and loss of effectiveness.
Only through rapidly developed innovative actions will the
vessel be able to overcome the emergency.
Although the Adhocracy may be the optimum, there are
environmental factors particular to the WMEC-270 and other
similar class vessels that require a structure with a little
more control, the Professional Bureaucracy. Two of the most
important factors are the Coast Guard's personnel rotation
policies and the frequency with which emergency activities are
conducted.
In the Adhocracy, crew members develop respect, author-
ity, and trust based upon their performance and their display
of professionalism rather than on the position they hold within
the organization. The respect and trust are particularly im-
portant and give rise to authority for certain people in certain
situations. If respect and trust are insufficient then only
8^

the power of the position remain - and in an emergency that
power may not be sufficient to control the activity. The more
often people are transferred the more difficult it is to develop
respect and trust among crew members. An example of this can
be seen on board Coast Guard vessels as a result of the alter-
nating rotations of the Commanding Officer and the Executive
Officer (one rotates one summer and the other the next summer).
While some crew members may be quick to test the new Commanding
Officer, most will rely on the Executive Officer for making
decisions and influencing policy. After a time the Commanding
Officer will develop the respect and trust he or she needs to
participate actively in the decision making and planning pro-
cesses. If the rotation policies change the Adhocracy may be-
come practical and therefore optimum. Or, the new WMEC-270's
may be a unique case because of the length of time many of the
crew members are together as part of the precommissioning de-
tail. The amount of training and other shared experiences
during this time period may make it possible to develop an
Adhocracy once the vessel begins operations.
The second environmental condition that reduces the
potential of the Adhocracy for controlling Group III activities
is that these activities occur infrequently. While it is pos-
sible to develop the respect and trust necessary for an Adhocracy
during less intensive activities (Group II), it is best that
they are developed during the activities in which the respect
and trust will be converted to increased authority for the sake
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of promoting innovation. If the frequency of emergency activ-
ities were ever increased, maybe as a result of another Vietnam-
type conflict, the Adhocracy would become the preferred structural
design. As long as there is no change to the frequency of
occurrence or the tour lengths, the Professional Bureaucracy
would remain the most practical design.
Table 4- summarizes the match of organizational struc-
ture to activity grouping. The structures shown in parentheses
represent the true optimum if certain conditions unique to the
WMEC-270 (already discussed) change; e.g., tour lengths or
routinization of Group I activities. The remainder of the chap-
ter will discuss the optimum design for all three groupings.
C. DESIGN STRATEGIES
To control all vessel activities there are three major
options. First, one of the three optimum designs can be selec-
ted recognizing that it may have certain disadvantages in one
or two of the activity groupings. Second, an entirely new
structure could be designed which incorporates the advantages
of all three designs and minimizes the disadvantages. Third,
the process by which the organization can shift its structure
from one design to another without creating confusion could
be developed.
1 . Option 1
Since the Professional Bureaucracy has already been




Proper Match Between Activity Grouping and Structural Design
Activities Structural Design
Group I (Intense Inport Activities) Simple (Machine
Bureaucracy)
Group II (Routine Inport & Underway Professional Bureaucracy
Activities)




Group III activities, it is likely that this design would be
selected for controlling all vessel activities provided this
option were selected. It is important to remember that each
structural design possess certain benefits and disadvantages
with respect to the other designs depending on which activity
grouping they are matched with. Table 5 summarizes the rela-
tionship between the structural design and the activity group-
ings. The Machine Bureaucracy is listed instead of the Simple
structure for two reasons. First, the Simple structure is
expected to evolve over time into the Machine Bureaucracy.
Second, it provides an opportunity to compare the Machine Bu-
reaucracy (the design presently being used by Coast Guard ves-
sels) with the Professional Bureaucracy and the Adhocracy.
2. Option 2
If the second option, developing a new hybrid structure
which incorporates the benefits of the three designs, is de-
sired, then figure 11 represents such a design. The Executive
Officer, Engineering Officer, Operations Officer, and Weapons
Officer are the key to this design. They would serve outside
the normal hierarchial chain and act as primary coordinators
between the functional groups; e.g., Engineering department
and the task groups; e.g., damage control team. The dotted
line connections represent strong communication links and weak
supervisory links. The degree to which these members of the
crew served as coordinators would vary depending on the type
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task groups are largely ignored and the four coordinators in-
sure that all the information from the functional groups is
passed up to the Commanding Officer and that the tasks being
performed are in accordance with the established regulations
and properly supervised at the lower levels. The four coor-
dinators would serve to balance the emphasis between the two
groupings during Group II activities. They would insure that
the expected degree of professionalism was present among crew
members or take action to improve that level. They would also
insure that only the most important information was being trans-
mitted along formal communication channels. Group III activities
could require a high degree of coordination particularly since
standard procedures are not always observed or even desired.
The four coordinators would fulfill this requirement for suffi-
cient integration of all the subtasks that comprise the emer-
gency activity. They would also serve to recognize, encourage,
and reward innovative behavior during these activities.
The particular advantage of this second option is that
the hybrid structure provides the morphogenic capability iden-
tified earlier in this thesis as an important though rarely
mentioned design parameter. Consequently, the structure would
be able to change patterns of communication, supervision, and
evaluation as the environment changes.
3- Option 3
The third option would be easy to introduce but diffi-
cult to maintain effectively. From the introduction standpoint
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it is generally clear what activities are ongoing at any one
time. Group I and Group III activities have been character-
ized as having distinct beginning and end points. Whenever
neither of these activities are being performed, it can gen-
erally be assumed that Group II activities are being conducted.
The difficulty of effectively maintaining the continuous tran-
sition stems from the necessity to insure that all middle and
high level members of the crew are indoctrinated in the three
structural designs and feel comfortable working in all three
climates. Over time this could create problems for some mem-
bers of the vessel's crew who might prefer one design over an-
other or be better indoctrinated in the use of one design as
opposed to another.
Each of these options has relative advantages and dis-
advantages which are dependent almost entirely on factors re-
lated to the vessel's crew and Commanding Officer. Some
examples include: degree of professional training, percent of
personnel allowance on board, and how comfortable the Command-
ing Officer and other crew members are with more complex
structures which provide multiple communication channels. It
will ultimately be the responsibility of the Commanding Officer
to select that option which is best suited to his or her organ-
ization. If no change is made, then the Commanding Officer
should understand that option one is in effect utilizing the
Machine Bureaucracy to control all three activity groupings
despite its shortcomings in controlling two of the activity
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groups. Reasons for selecting some other option or at least






There are two major reasons for considering changes to the
long established Machine Bureaucracy: technology and people.
It is the purpose of this final chapter to examine what effects
these two factors have on organizational design and vice versa.
A. TECHNOLOGY
Technology both influences and is influenced by organiza-
tional design. The degree of complexity should be the greatest
source of technological influence. If the task to be performed
is simple or can at least be broken down into simple subtasks
then it can be easily controlled through rules and regulations
and direct supervision. This also permits a high ratio of
workers to supervisors which reduces manpower costs. The Ma-
chine Bureaucracy would be ideal for this and similar situations
When the tasks are nonroutine, possess a high degree of com-
plexity, require a high degree of integration, and cannot be
clearly defined, the organization is difficult to bureaucratize
.
In these more complex cases, more discretion must be given to
lower level personnel who will rely on their experience and
professionalism for task direction (Perrow, 1972) . The Pro-
fessional Bureaucracy or even Adhocracy would be best suited
for controlling this type of technology.
For Coast Guard vessels, the tasks in recent years have
become increasingly complex and less routine. The WMEC-270
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should accelerate this trend particularly since many of the
most routine functions have been automated; e.g., milstrip
requisition and sounding tanks. Some tasks considered routine
by other vessels will be initially nonroutine for the WMEC-270
because it is a new class of vessel; e.g., ordering commissary
supplies because the vessel has limited reefer capacity and
microwave ovens. Many organizations will attempt to routinize
their operations and the Coast Guard is no exception. Group
I activities are examples of this type of routinization. But
beyond these activities (Group II and III) there is less and
less opportunity for routinization of tasks. The Coast Guard
has taken on more missions over the years and is still shifting
emphasis as events such as the Cuban refugees and the 200 mile
fishing boundary require. The WMEC-270 will be performing most
of the present Coast Guard missions and probably some additional
missions not yet the responsibility of the Coast Guard. The
frequency with which the Coast Guard revises its publications
is a prime example of how difficult routinization is under
present environmental conditions which are frequently complex
and unstable. Under such conditions, the Professional Bureau-
cracy, the Adhocracy, and even the Simple structure would be
much preferred over the current Machine Bureaucracy because
of their leanings toward decentralization (Professional Bureau-
cracy)
,
organic structure (Simple), or both (Adhocracy).
Technology is also influenced by organizational structure.
In a Machine Bureaucracy, for example, the supervisor wants
95

to be sure he or she is in control of what subordinates are
doing and how they are doing it without having to be contin-
uously present. Consequently, the trend will be toward stan-
dardization and repetition. Supervisors will reward (sometimes
even unconsciously) performance that is the same as they wanted
it done and the same as they would have done it. It is often
not realized by supervisors and managers that tasks used to be
performed under a different sei; of environmental factors.
There were more people, a higher budget, simpler technology,
and less emphasis on personnel welfare. Many of the standard-
ized procedures developed under those environmental conditions
are no longer optimal or even suitable yet it will be diffi-
cult for change with the current organizational structure which
supports that standardization philosophy. Earlier in this
thesis the Coast Guard Commandant's call for more innovation
was referenced. Innovation doesn't just happen. It requires
a flexible structure that reduces centralization, direct super-
vision, and standardized operating procedures wherever possible
While the Professional Bureaucracy and Adhocracy will not bring
about innovation by themselves, the adoption of these struc-
tures will help to create an atmosphere where innovation can
flourish and will support other Coast Guard efforts to improve
managerial innovation such as the Leadership and Management
Schools. The way in which tasks are performed, people are
supervised and managed, and organizations are designed are all
examples of technologies - technologies which will not change
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People, also, both influence and are influenced by organ-
izational structure. The simplest example is that people who
control an organization; e.g., owner or "board of directors,
can select any structural design desired. But, people lower
in the organization can also influence the structure. They
can do this by the way in which they choose to interact with
one another. An example would be an Adhocracy which attempts
to foster innovation but supervisors base their evaluation
and reward mechanisms on standardization and formalization.
The Adhocracy would quickly evolve into a Machine Bureaucracy.
People can also introduce decentralization by simply forcing
the problems back down for action. This could be risky since
decentralization needs to be related to a high degree of train-
ing to insure that those people ending up with the decision
making authority also possess the expertise to make those
decisions.
Because organizational structure affects how people inter-
act with one another to accomplish tasks and because the struc-
ture affects how much freedom an individual will have to develop
his or her talents, people are influenced by the structural
design. Structures with high degrees of formalization and
standardization will tend, over the long term, to attract
97

people that prefer that climate. In time, the workers will
follow the rules for the sake of the rules themselves, since
this is the basis on which they are evaluated. People in de-
cision making positions tend to create more rules when new
situations arise. Workers will attempt to avoid autonomy and
decisions which are associated with risk taking (Hall, 1972).
There are organizations and people who prefer this type of
rigid environment. Those people who don't, will generally
either adjust their preferences or opt out of the organization
rather than remain discontent. Unfortunately, this latter
option is not always available for Coast Guard personnel who
often have obligated service or feel economically trapped after
15 or 16 years by the 20 year retirement system. Consequently,
they either adapt their behavior to following the rules for
the sake of the rules, develop an attitude of discontent, or
both. Members of decentralized and organic structures who find
themselves ill suited can also opt out or they can attempt to
develop a more innovative and interactive approach to their




Duncan (1979) has identified three symptoms which provide
an indication that the organization and its structure are mis-
matched. The first is decision making. When the structure
does not match the needs of the organization, decisions will
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be inadequate. Decision makers will be unable to anticipate
problems, predict future trends, or generate sufficient infor-
mation to make confident and accurate decisions. The second
is problem solving - the organization simply is unable to
develop new techniques for overcoming problems. The third
symptom is personnel dissatisfaction. Individuals could be
experiencing role conflict as a result of too much standard-
ization or they could be experiencing role ambiguity as a re-
sult of insufficient standardization. Top level managers can
make important contributions to their organizations by watching
for these symptoms and taking corrective action as necessary
to improve the organization's dynamic processes.
Ultimately it will be the responsibility of people who
have the authority to design structures (in this case the WMEC-
270 Commanding Officer) to develop the structure which not only
provides the best control over the required tasks but also
helps to develop the type of personnel the organization de-
sires - people who prefer standardization and formalization
or those vho prefer professionalization and innovation. If people
truly are the Coast Guard's most valuable resource then organ-
izational designs such as the Professional Bureaucracy and the
Adhocracy which promote the development of that resource must
be preferred to designs such as the Machine Bureaucracy which
inhibits the development of that resource.
I believe that personnel are the Coast Guard's greatest
resource and that organizational structure is a technology which
can affect the development and utilization of that resource.
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The delivery of the new WMEC-270's offers a unique oppor-
tunity for the Coast Guard to determine through realistic
experiments the optimum structural design. Since the first
four vessels are the same age, perform the same missions, and
have the same homeport, each could select or be assigned a
different design alternative; e.g., Machine Bureaucracy, Pro-
fessional Bureaucracy, new hybrid structure, or different
structures for each group of activities (option 3)
•
Over time, the performance of each vessel could be measured
through such factors as retention, crew satisfaction as deter-
mined through survey data, operational conduct, and subjective
evaluation. While there may be some intangibles which affect
performance variances (if any) such as the differences in the
Commanding Officer's leadership styles, much of the variance
will be attributable to structural design distinctions.
This opportunity to experiment may not come again for many
years. Failing to take advantage of this opportunity would
deny the Coast Guard a chance to engage in the implementation
of innovative management techniques. Taking advantage of this
opportunity may not cost much and may generate substantial ben-
efits. Moreover, it would be a visible display of the Coast
Guard's concern for its personnel resource.
I believe strongly that if the experiment is undertaken,
the Machine Bureaucracy will prove .less effective than other
alternatives, but I believe more strongly that the Coast Guard
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